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Globalization of monitoring practices: The case of American 
influences on the dismissal risk of European CEOs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) 
influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs.  Specifically, we 
argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system 
increase the dismissal performance sensitivity faced by European CEOs, indirectly and directly. 
The former materializes via European firms cross-listing on U.S. exchanges, the latter results 
from European firms hiring U.S. independent board members. Both influences are expected to 
result in increased dismissal performance sensitivity. Based on data from the 250 largest 
European publicly traded firms we find a significant increase in the dismissal sensitivity of 
poorly performing companies with American board members and a support for migration of 
American executive pay practice. However, no significant increase in dismissal performance 
sensitivity was identified from U.S. cross-listing.  In line with our agency theory based 
prediction, this indicates an institutional contagion driven by the presence of U.S. board 
members on European corporate boards. To policy makers the message is that 
internationalization of boards should not be banned or restricted, since it provides owners with 
more options to influence the corporate governance of the firm. 
 
JEL classification:  G15, G18, G32, M14, M16, M52 
 
Keywords: executive pay, CEO dismissal, performance sensitivity, foreign board membership 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fundamental differences exist between corporate governance systems around the world (e.g., Denis & 
McConnell, 2003; La Porta, de Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Such differences are found in the CEO 
compensation field (Fernandes et al, 2008, Murphy, 2012) where some differences in compensation may  
reflect differences of CEO dismissal risk (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005). Among the four main corporate 
governance systems; the Anglo-American system, the German system, the Latin system and the Japanese 
system (see e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Goergen, 1998), some will argue that the U.S.-based Anglo-
American corporate governance system is the most demanding one (Lucier, Schuyt & Handa, 2004), 
where poor performance is more likely to lead to CEO dismissal. We argue that the strong link between 
firm performance and CEO pay is one unique characteristic of the corporate governance system in the 
United States. This difference is also highlighted by the fact that U.S. boards tend to be much more 
involved in making governance decisions, such as CEO hiring/firing, than European boards (Bonini, 
Alkan and Salvi, 2012). The aim of this paper is to explore how possible firm-based influence from the 
U.S. corporate governance system impact CEO dismissal practice among European companies.  
The Americanization
1
 of the corporate governance systems may take two major routes:  one via 
legislation (and then followed by institutional changes) and another via corporate actions (Coffee, 2002).  
In this study we focus on the latter route. We analyze European companies and the influence on 
dismissal performance sensitivity following from their exposure to the U.S. corporate governance 
system.  We analyze the influence following from two kinds of effort to do this; to actually comply with 
the U.S. system (cross-listing) and to signal compliance by recruiting at least one independent U.S. board 
member. 
                                                          
1
 We use the term American and Americanization in this paper in relation to the U.S. – as Canadian corporate 
governance have strong elements from both the U.S. and the U.K. 
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It is commonly argued that globalization of the firm produces a more complex task environment 
for top management (e.g. Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). In this paper we claim 
that the compliance with the American corporate governance system means a new monitoring regime for 
the complying firm which also implies increased dismissal performance sensitivity.  An indirect support 
for this is found in Oxelheim & Randøy (2005), who observed higher compensation to CEOs of non-
American firms with Anglo-American listing and/or board influence. They argue that European CEOs 
exposed to American corporate governance may anticipate their higher risk exposure (heavily penalized 
for a performance shortfall), and thus demand a risk premium and a higher salary. Specifically, the 
higher compensation of America over European CEOs reflects that the American corporate governance 
system is less tolerant of poor firm performance – and more likely to dismiss the CEO (Lucier, Schuyt & 
Handa, 2004).   
Furthermore, the greater CEO dismissal performance sensitivity generates an internationalization 
cost that has been neglected in the literature.  This cost reflects CEOs’ reduced job security, an increased 
likelihood of shorter tenure, and a potentially negative impact on the reputation of the incumbent in case 
of dismissal.  Countries with a relatively low level of CEO turnover can expect to face higher levels of 
CEO dismissal performance sensitivity as their firms become exposed to monitoring and regulations 
from financial markets with less turnover tolerance for poor performance (i.e., the case of American 
financial markets). 
In the empirical part of the paper we study CEO turnover among the 250 largest European 
publicly traded firms in 2004. In line with the arguments of Hall & Gingerich (2009) we do not expect 
the effect of financial globalization to be uniform. Thus, we see the need to address financial 
internationalization (in the form of American influence in our case) on firm-level outcomes (CEO 
dismissals).  With due attention to missing observations, we investigate 270 succession events over a 
four year period between 2000 and 2004. We study the likelihood that such events will be forced, and 
thus involuntary (and not that the dismissal event occurs in the first place), given that the firm has 
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significant American influence (through American board membership or American exchange listing). 
We find a significant increase in the dismissal sensitivity in poorly performing companies with American 
board membership whereas no significant increase is found from cross-listing in the U.S. Our result 
supports the presence of American members on the boards of European firms as a channel for migration 
of U.S. governance practice to Europe.  
The paper is organized in the following way.  In Section 2 we review past studies on dismissal 
performance sensitivity, and present the research question. Theoretically we base our study on agency 
theory and managerial power.  In Section 3 we propose two research hypotheses to be tested, followed 
by Section 4 in which we describe the European data and focus on key binary relationships. In Section 5, 
we specify the statistical model and test the hypothesized relationships in a multivariate setting.  Finally, 
we summarize the key findings and discuss managerial and policy implications in Section 6. 
 
2. DISMISSAL PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY 
 
The linkage between firm-level internationalization and CEO pay has been identified by past studies, 
whereas the role of dismissal risk as part of this linkage has received almost no attention.  Sanders & 
Carpenter (1998) report a positive relationship between international sales and CEO compensation in 
U.S. firms, and Girma, Thompson & Wright (2002) found a similar result for large U.K. firms. 
Furthermore, Oxelheim & Randøy (2005) report a positive relationship between CEO pay and the 
internationalization of sales, internationalization of ownership and internationalization of board 
membership of Scandinavian firms. The present study focus on a more narrow and specific kind of 
international influence: The cross-border American influence on European CEOs’ dismissal risk. 
Whereas the direct linkage between performance and dismissal/turnover has been addressed in 
past research (e.g. Chakraborty, Sheikh & Subramanian, 2009; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), the moderating 
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effect of firm level internationalization has not. Specifically, our center of attention is on the dismissal 
performance sensitivity, and how this sensitivity of European firms is moderated by influences from 
American practice via two vehicles; American stock exchange listing or inclusion of an American board 
member. 
Agency theory provides a normative approach to the role of executive incentives (including pay 
and risk factors) as a corporate governance mechanism.  Managerial  incentives  should  bridge the gap  
between  the interest  of managers  versus  the interest  of owners  (e.g.  Fama & Jensen, 1983), and 
empirical U.S.-based evidence shows that strong incentives (stock options in general) produce higher 
firm productivity (Bulan, Sanyal & Yan, 2010). The implication is that companies should be paying 
CEOs with more incentive-based pay than the supply and demand of executive talent would suggest (e.g. 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990). We argue here that agency theory also provides the underlying rationale for 
the increased CEO dismissal performance sensitivity related to the internationalization of the firm. Past 
research has identified a specific pay premium for Scandinavian CEOs being exposed to Anglo-
American board members and foreign regulatory authorities (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2005).  We suggest 
that part of this pay premium is a compensation for the stronger relationship between performance and 
dismissal among firms exposed to such international (American in our case) corporate governance 
monitoring. 
The managerial power and managerial entrenchment literature suggests that the governance of 
corporate behavior may deviate from the normative perspective of agency theory (for an overview see 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). U.S.-based research indicates that some CEOs have been able to build a power 
base that weakens – or even isolates the CEO – from shareholder demands (Boyd, 1994; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). Specifically, Allgood & Farrell (2000) found that CEO tenure (a proxy for managerial 
power) moderates the relation between firm performance and CEO turnover. They found that entrenched 
CEOs are less exposed to performance–forced dismissals. We argue that globalization of the firm affects 
the potential for CEO entrenchment.  
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3. HYPOTHESES 
 
The point of departure of this paper is that the American corporate governance system, particularly 
during the early 2000s, is to be seen as the most demanding and unforgiving corporate governance 
system in the world (Lucier, Schuyt & Handa, 2004). This view is based on factors such as a high risk of 
dismissal, a focus on short-term (quarterly) results, and a high degree of transparency vis-a-vis investors. 
After the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 – the weaknesses of the American corporate governance 
system have been highlighted but that debate is beyond this paper.  We argue that the more demanding 
the corporate governance system, the less the degree of freedom for the CEO. The most frequently used 
form of corporate governance in Europe is the insider or control–oriented system (Berglöf, 2000; La 
Porta, de Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). In this corporate governance system the emphasis is on the ability of 
large shareholders to monitor corporate behavior (Angblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt & Svancar, 2001), as 
opposed to the American system where monitoring is exercised by a market for corporate control and 
institutional monitoring (e.g. SEC and stock exchanges).  In line with this, we suggest that CEOs in firms 
in non-American countries that move closer to the American system of corporate governance will face 
increased dismissal performance sensitivity due to institutional contagion. 
We emphasize two specific firm activities that signal to the international investor community 
compliance with an American standard of monitoring corporate behavior. Cross-listing in an American 
stock market is one of these activities. Recruitment of at least one independent board member 
representing a more demanding corporate governance system, i.e. the American system is the other.  
These activities open the way for an institutional spill-over effect that enhances the CEOs pay while 
simultaneously increases his/her risk of involuntary dismissal.  Signals of this kind imply an upgrading 
of the corporate governance monitoring compared with that provided solely by the domestic system. 
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3.1 Cross-listing and dismissal performance sensitivity 
International cross-listing is a generally recognized way of breaking away from a domestic capital 
market (e.g., Foerster & Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Salva, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz, 2004).  
Cross-listing implies that the firm will be scrutinized by a new international investor clientele; it will be 
exposed to new regulatory authorities, and it will need to comply with new standards with regards to 
disclosure and accounting.  We suggest that cross-listing in American markets exposes the CEO to 
higher career risks and rewards. For most firms from semi-segmented capital markets, excluding the few 
companies  that already enjoy an international cost of capital, an American  stock exchange listing is a 
big step, for which the firms concerned have historically been rewarded with a higher market value 
(Modén & Oxelheim, 1997; Stulz, 1999). However, it should be noted that such rewards have been 
substantially reduced recently – and even in some cases become a liability (Marosi & Massoud, 2008). 
Part of the possible value-creation arising from such an American  cross-listing is captured by the CEO 
(rent-sharing) who possesses the scarce set of skills necessary for a successful cross-listing (Oxelheim  & 
Randøy, 2005). We argue that the new regulatory environment and the new investor clientele envisaged 
at the listing on the U.S. financial market will confront the CEOs with harsher monitoring implying 
increased dismissal performance sensitivity. 
Hypothesis 1:  For European firms there is a positive relationship between a cross-listing in the U.S. and 
the CEO’s dismissal performance sensitivity. 
 
 
3.2 Outsider American board members and dismissal performance sensitivity 
Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role of the board of directors in sustaining an 
effective organization (OECD, 1999; Jensen, 1993). Oxelheim & Randøy (2005) show that for 
Scandinavian firms with one or more independent American board members the CEO of such a firm 
receives a significantly higher compensation than a CEO of a firm without a board member of that kind.  
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One of their explanations of this finding is the signal these companies send out about being open for a 
harsher American styled monitoring.  Consequently, CEOs in such a position will be exposed to a clash 
between two corporate governance cultures, and the reconciliation of the two systems will pose new 
challenges and tasks for them.  Among other things this may call for a new corporate language (Piekkari, 
Randøy and Oxelheim, 2010), new internal reporting requirements, new investor-relation activities 
(Useem, 1998) and a higher dismissal risk.  When combined with the lower tolerance for poor 
performance (particularly the emphasis on quarterly results), characterizing the American corporate 
governance system, the dismissal performance sensitivity will change. 
Hypothesis 2: For European firms there is a positive relationship between the presence of a least one 
outsider American board member of these firms and the CEO’s dismissal performance sensitivity. 
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4. DATA 
 
4.1 Data sources 
We have chosen to study large European publicly traded firms and the CEO successions of these firms.  
The reason for the choice of only large firms is the access to relevant information.  The crucial 
classification of successions into different categories heavily relies on the information published in 
newspapers and magazines.  Only larger firms are in general covered by the media.  Moreover, our 
explanatory variable, “cross-listing on U.S. stock exchanges”, is also dependent on published 
information.  Since smaller firms may opt for ADR level-1 or over-the-counter listing, with less 
demanding  financial  reporting  and  disclosure  requirement,  we argue that the choice of large firms is 
further motivated.  However, the choice of only larger firms comes at the expense of fewer observations.  
This forces us to household with our degrees of freedom by making a thorough analysis of missing 
values. 
Data was collected for the 250 largest (by market capitalization in 2004) European publicly traded firms 
during the time period of 2000-2004. The study is based on the population of CEO succession events as 
reported in the financial media (e.g. Financial Times).  Data on these events and linked performance 
data were collected and reported by Booz Allen Hamilton (until 2004). Specifically, they measure firm 
performance (“total stock return”) in relation to the stock performance o firms’ industry peer group, one 
year prior to the dismissal event. Information regarding independent American board membership 
(defined as American citizens) and the cross-listing of European firms on American markets has either 
been collected from Annual Reports, company web pages, or solicited through direct contact with the 
firms. The definition of all variables used in the study is given in the Appendix A1. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics  
In the period of our study (2000-2004), 270 succession events occurred among the largest 250 European 
companies. As shown in Table 1, these CEO succession events are distributed over fourteen EU 
countries. Only 7% of the succession cases reported involved European firms from non-EU countries 
like Norway, Switzerland and the Russian Republic.  Approximately 41% of the 270 CEO succession 
events occurred in British companies, while 14% of all succession cases happened in companies located 
in Germany and 10% in French companies.  Hence, observations from those three countries account for 
65% of all observations.  
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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The dismissal events appear in a broad range of industries.  The group “Industrials” is the biggest group 
whereas  “Energy”  is the smallest  in terms  of turnover  events.  However, in relation to how many 
firms there are in each industry in our material the probability changes substantially. The circumstances 
surrounding each turnover case were researched and characterized by one of 11 categories listed in Table 
2. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Each category reflects a more or less precise reason for the CEO succession.  On average the event firms 
have a small negative return (-2.4% stock return one year leading up to the event) over and above the one 
of other firm in the same industry – but the spread in return is high (standard deviation of 22%).2  The 
descriptive analysis  shows that in about 27% of our succession cases the information available about 
them were (by outside observers) interpreted as being indicative of a turnover due to “poor 
performance”.3 This modal category contains cases in which a CEO is simply fired by the board or 
forced out of the position in a more subtle way.  Almost 24% of the recorded successions were 
characterized as planned successions, events which were known to happen (due to contractual 
                                                          
2
 We use industry adjusted returns rather than regional adjusted returns (using regional stock indices). The arguments are 
twofold: First, the regional/national markets are closely integrated in Europe and little discriminating effect could be expected 
from using regional adjustment. Second, the industry adjusted return could be expected to have a strong discriminating effect 
as opposed to regional adjusted return. This is particularly the case since we look at the largest 250 firms in Europe, that 
commonly have more activity abroad than in their home markets (cases like Volvo, Nokia, Volkswagen, Siemens, Alcatel, etc).   
3
 The categorization is provided by Booz Allen Hamilton with reliability checks carried out by the authors. 
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arrangements or retirement).  The third dominant category is constituted by succession events which 
happen in the course of a merger. A connection to takeover or merger activity was established in more 
than 24% of the recorded events. The events associated with one of these three categories account for 
75% of the total number of cases.  
For the purpose of our CEO succession study we introduce a simple dichotomy based on the 
relatively fine grid of reasons exhibited in Table 3.  We need to distinguish events in which a decision 
unit (integral part of the company, e.g.  the board) decides to remove the CEO from his position due to 
motives (unplanned  developments) related to the company and implements the decision in one way or 
another against the preferences of the CEO. Such circumstances are thought of as a forced succession.   
If a CEO leaves to take a comparable position in another company, she/he implements her/his 
preferences.  Such cases are referred to as unforced (by an internal force) in the sequel.  Note that the 
death of a CEO hardly constitutes voluntary change in the leadership.   But since it is not forced by an 
exogenous force such events are classified as unforced.  The distribution of succession events in a 
dichotomous way is given in Table 3. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
After selecting the succession cases which are not related to merger activity, we can rely on a 
total of 204 dismissal cases.  Each of our succession cases can be classified as either a dismissal (forced 
succession) or a voluntary one. Since M&A’s may be undertaken for disciplining or management 
performance reasons, they may sometimes appear to fit the criteria for a forced succession.  However, 
mergers/takeovers are in the grey area between forced and voluntary dismissal.  We extensively made 
tests for the robustness of the classification – specifically that the results are robust to variation in 
definitions of the grey area of mergers/takeovers (tests not reported)  
The basic descriptive statistics for all relevant variables are given in Table 4. We list the number 
of observations used in the computation of the respective estimate(s) for each variable in the second 
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column of the table.  An n less than 204 indicates the presence of missing values for the variable at hand.
 We have also registered the age of CEOs involved in the succession events. We managed to 
collect CEO age from 266 of the 270 succession event - which vary between the ages of 28 and 75.  The 
youngest CEO, Jonas Birgerson, was affiliated with a Swedish information technology firm (Framfab).   
He was removed from his position in the course of a merger (acquisition) episode in 2000.  The two 
CEO successions which involved 75 year old individuals were both planned.  In the case of the British 
hardware company Farnell PLC, Morton Mandel served as an interim CEO for six month, while in the 
other case Hans-Joachim Langmann retired from the CEO position, (Vorstandsvorsitzender) at the 
pharmaceutical company Merck after holding that position for 30 years. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Based on our study we can expect a CEO involved in a succession event to be about 56 years old 
(standard deviation of 7.2).  Half of our age observations lie between 52 and 61, i.e. are distributed over 
19% of the range.  The skewness measure of -.54 indicates an asymmetrical age distribution, i.e. the age 
distribution is skewed to the left and the CEO variable is not normally distributed. The non-normal 
distribution has specifically been a consideration in the choice of analysis.   CEO tenure varies between 
slightly more than a month (interim positions) and 43 years. The latter case is Calisto Tanzi the chairman 
and founder of the Italian company Parmalat who was dismissed at the age of 65 due to poor 
performance in 2003.  Based on our sample we can expect a CEO to be in his (”her” in only one case!) 
position for 6 years before he (she) is replaced.  The median duration on the job is 1.2 years lower:  in 
50% of all cases an individual served more than 4.8 years as CEO before the position was filled by a 
successor. We observe that 74% of the sample firms have an American stock exchange listing, but only 
18% have an American board member. Furthermore, the correlation between the two main independent 
variables, American board membership and American exchange listing, is only 0.1 – and not significant.   
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4.3 The missing data problem 
Complete data records for all the included variables (including control variables) are available on only 
165 of the 204 cases.  There are no missing values for the dependent variable (dismissal).  However, the 
same statement holds only for a subset of the independent variables. Only the indicator variable U.S. 
exchange listing and the categorical variables country grouping and industry category are complete.  All 
other variables have missing observations for certain cases.  There is only one case in which we do not 
have an observation on CEO tenure.  But the information about the presence of at least one U.S. board 
member is not available on 9% (19 cases) of the records.    
With close to 20% of our succession cases being incomplete together with a shortage of degrees 
of freedom, we first have to make clear that the apparent lack of data will not have any adverse effects 
when estimating models involving the variables given in Table 5. The theory distinguishes between three 
types of missing data which are more or less ominous for an analysis; missing complete at random 
(mcar); missing at random (mar) and “missing not at random” (mnar). The last alternative is the worst. 
However, in practice, cases with at least one missing value on it are often simply discarded.  To see 
whether this so-called complete case analysis is admissible from a statistical point of view we need to 
establish the type of ”missingness”  prevalent in our data. In the case of mar and mnar, a complete case 
analysis will imply inefficient and biased estimators of the model parameters.  If one can establish the 
mcar case, then the estimates obtained using complete case analysis are still going to be inefficient but 
unbiased  (van  der Heijden,  Donders, Stijnen & Moons, 2006; Little, 1992).  With respect to likelihood 
based inference, Rubin (1976) has demonstrated that likelihood ratios are invariant to discarding of 
incomplete records in the mcar case. Fortunately, it is possible to test if data are mcar on the basis of the 
sample. We do not report the analysis of the missing data but have concluded from our test that missing 
data are of mcar-kind implying that using a complete case analysis will not trigger a bias in our 
estimators. 
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5. MODEL AND RESULTS 
 
To provide a framework which allows us to test the hypotheses motivated in Section 3, we chose a 
binary response type model.  In our context, the probability for the event that a CEO succession is forced 
as opposed to voluntary is modeled as a non-linear function of risk factors. After stating the model 
explicitly, we discuss some aspects concerning statistical inference.  Two alternative specifications of the 
model are introduced and the estimation results are presented. 
5.1 The binary response model 
We consider the dichotomous random variable Y taking the value 1 if a succession case is a dismissal.  If 
the succession is voluntary then the variable assumes the value 0.  It is assumed that the discrete random 
variable Y follows a Bernoulli distribution depending on the parameter p ∈ (0, 1), the probability  of 
dismissal.  Moreover, we assume that there exists a non-linear functional relationship  between  the 
dismissal  probability  and  a  set  of independent  variables represented by the elements of the vector z, 
i.e. p = F (Oiz), where F is monotonically increasing function and O  denotes a parameter vector of 
appropriate dimension.  Under these assumptions the binary random variable Y follows the Bernoulli 
distribution: 
 
Y  ∼ B(F (Oiz)) = F (Oiz)y  (1 — F (Oiz))1—y  I{O,1}(y)                                                  (1) 
where I{O,1} denotes the indicator function.  Hence 
E[Y  | Z = z] = p = F (Oiz)                                                                                              (2) 
represents the (non-linear) regression of the random variable Y on the explanatory variables 
listed in z. 
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5.2 Specification of the model 
Two specifications of the binary response model (1) are discussed below: the logistic specification and 
the probit specification.  In our case, there is no substantive information available which would let us 
choose between the two alternatives a priori.  We chose to consider both to see whether our results are 
invariant under alternative specifications. We employ the specifications of the binary response model (1) 
to test the hypotheses concerning the relationship between the dismissal probability p and U.S. exchange 
listing (Hypothesis 1), as well as the relation between p and U.S. board membership (Hypothesis  2).   
In order to avoid the misspecification of the statistical model, that might produce unreliable 
estimates, we base our theoretical analysis on Harrel, Lee, Matchar & Reichert (1985). They conclude 
that such problems can be avoided if the ratio of the number of outcome events to the number of 
explanatory variables (EVP-ratio) lies between 10 and 20. These results were clearly supported in an 
extensive simulation study by Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper, Holford & Feinstein (1996).  Following their 
guidelines and taking our data situation into consideration, we should not include more than ten 
explanatory variables when modeling the probability of the event “forced succession”. 
As a result of a structured exploratory modeling phase involving all potential explanatory 
variables  introduced  in Section 3, it became clear that the variables CEO tenure and market value could 
be eliminated from the variable  pool.  Moreover, controlling for all other important factors the industry 
categories were never found to be significant.  
It is possible that sole industry adjusted stock performance (one year prior to the event) does not 
have a significant main effect on the probability of dismissal, but the effect of the total stock return 
varies with some characteristics of the succession case or the nature of the environment in which the case 
is embedded.  To account for such interaction effects we introduce the two interaction terms; U.S. 
exchange listing × return and U.S. board  membership  × return into the model (a term over and above 
the first order term).  These interaction terms constitute the variables z9   and z10.  The resulting logit 
and probit version of model (2) is estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) approach. 
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5.3 Estimation Results 
Prior to performing the ML estimation procedure we assessed whether the sufficient condition for the 
existence, finiteness and uniqueness of estimates as given by Albert & Anderson (1984, Theorem 3, p.7)  
is fulfilled. A numerical check confirmed that our data exhibits the pattern referred to as overlap, 
implying that the sufficient condition holds.  As could be expected in such a case, we observed a rapid 
convergence of the algorithm locating the maximum of the likelihood function under both specifications. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Our ML estimation results are summarized in Table 5.  At a first glance both models are valid and from a 
qualitative  point  of view the models produce identical results.  There are no differences in the signs of 
the estimated coefficients.  With respect to the statistical significance of the ML estimates, the findings 
are identical for the two specifications.  In both cases we do not find main effects for the variables U.S. 
exchange listing and U.S. board membership but a clearly significant interaction term U.S. board 
membership × return. This indicates the existence of a moderator effect of U.S. board membership on the 
relationship between the dismissal risk and the performance variable total stock return.
4
 Given that 
Powers (2005) highlight that our model (using interaction terms in non-linear models) could be 
misinterpreted, we have been particular careful in terms of checking for such possible misinterpretations. 
                                                          
4
 We have also preformed tests where the interaction terms are tested one by one – and the results remains 
statistically unchanged.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
By focusing on CEO dismissal risk, this paper addresses one aspect of internationalization of corporate 
governance practices across borders.  The issue of CEO dismissal and CEO incentives in its extension is 
of great concern to public policy-makers, to investors and to regulators amid the financial crisis of the 
first decades of the 2000s.  This is reflected in a number of corporate governance reports from the 
OECD, FIBV, and central banks on the one hand, and in the corporate governance guidelines from 
sources such as the Cadbury Commission, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, on the other.   The focus of 
this paper is on the influence of American corporate governance practice on dismissal performance 
sensitivity in European firms. We argue that the recruitment of American independent member(s) to 
European boards and the cross-listing of European firms on U.S. stock exchanges are important financial 
facilitators for the migration of ideas and practices from the U.S. to European corporate governance 
regimes. 
The applied research design provides a natural experiment on the issue of CEO dismissal and 
financial internationalization. By studying dismissal events, not dismissal probabilities as commonly 
seen in other dismissal studies, this paper allows for a test that clearly reduces endogeneity problems on 
the issue of reversed causality.  Furthermore, we include a set of control variables that have been 
included in prior studies (CEO age, industry-adjusted performance, country dummies). However, the list 
of control variables is of course not exhaustive, so future studies may investigate the role of control 
variables such as ownership characteristics (nationality, blockholders, family ownership) and variables 
reflecting the American board member sitting on European boards (their tenure, experience in European 
firms, tenure with other boards). To further check the robustness of our findings, we have applied 
alternative definitions to our key variables, such as using percentage rather than a binary variable for 
American board membership. This robustness check did not alter the results.  
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We study the population of succession events in the 250 largest European publicly listed firms 
between 2000 and 2004. Due to missing observations in relation to the independent variables (American 
board membership and control variables), we have some “missing observations by random”. Taking a 
critical position with respect to our own modeling approach, we carried out extensive model diagnostics 
and implemented model validation routines. The procedures resulted in no evidence against the statistical 
model chosen. 
We have found our results robust to the classification of the dismissal implications of mergers 
and acquisitions which are in general difficult to categorize.  Moreover, we have found no impact on the 
dismissal relation from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was implemented during the period of 
investigation (results not reported).  We found that firm performance alone has no direct effect on the 
dismissal risk which is in line with a range of compensation studies that find a small and some times 
insignificant underlying pay-performance relationship (Tosi, Werner, Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  
Finally, our country dummies indicate that the U.K. and Irish firms are significantly less likely to force 
CEO dismissal than firms from the Rhine-region countries.  Considering that the U.K. has a corporate 
governance system and shareholder protection environments comparable to the U.S. (La Porta, de 
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999) this result triggers a need for further research. 
In line with our theory-based prediction, the tests in this study show that internationalization in 
the market for corporate control increases dismissal performance sensitivity.  This indicates the presence 
of institutional contagion driven by American board membership on European corporate boards. 
However, this institutional contagion does not necessarily follow exactly the same routes for other parts 
of world. Transition of practices by American board members to Asian firms deserves a study of its own.  
We argue that the result is particularly interesting,  since non-American firms are becoming increasingly  
concerned  about the costs of American stock regulations in general and of the implementation of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in particular (Bartram, Stadtmann & Wissmann, 2006; Economist, 2006).   
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Contrary to our predictions, the empirical results show no significant increase in dismissal 
performance sensitivity stemming from American stock exchange cross-listing.  This effect might be due 
to the fact that foreign stock listing only indirectly affects boards’ decision-making, and/or the fact that 
we only looked at the period of 2000-2004.  The insignificance of the cross-listing variable may also 
reflect the inconclusiveness of previous research on European firms reflecting the relatively “weak” 
commitment in undertaking a cross-border listing as compared  to the more demanding corporate action 
of undertaking a cross-listing and an outright equity issue on the foreign market in one go (Modén & 
Oxelheim, 1997). 
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Table 1  Country composition of succession events 
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Table 2. Reasons for dismissal (2000–2004) 
 
 
Table 3 Distribution of categories 
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Table 4 Basic descriptive statistics 
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Variables 
 
 
Estimate 
Logit 
 
p-value 
 
 
S-Ind. 
 
 
Estimate 
Probit 
 
p-value 
 
 
S-Ind. 
Const. 11.22 0.000 *** 6.56 0.000 *** 
CEO age -0.19 0.000 *** -0.11 0.000 *** 
total stock return -0.85 0.610  -0.57 0.581  
country-group dummy 1 -0.96 0.037 ** -0.60 0.030 ** 
country-group dummy 2 -2.11 0.013 ** -1.27 0.007 ** 
country-group dummy 3 0.63 0.387  0.36 0.391  
country-group dummy 4 -1.41 0.060 * -0.86 0.058 * 
U.S. exchange  listing 0.61 0.187  0.36 0.187  
U.S. board  membership -0.74 0.224  -0.41 0.232  
U.S. listing × return 0.49 0.805  0.33 0.789  
U.S. board  membership  × return -11.94 0.021 ** -7.11 0.020 ** 
sample size 165   165   
Log-lik. 
 
pseudo R2 
-83.68 
 
0.27 
  -83.59 
 
0.27 
  
 
Table 5 Summary table for logit and probit models 
 
 
Legend:  S-ind.  ≡ significance indicator:  * if p < 0.10,   ** if p < 0.05,   *** if p < 0.001Country-group dummies: 
1= Ireland, United Kingdom; 2=Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands; 3=Italy, Portugal, Spain; 4=Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden  
